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The Retirement Decision: Current Influences
on the Timing of Retirement among Older Workers
Gaobo Pang, Mark Warshawsky and Ben Weitzer

The factors affecting workers’ retirement behavior have attracted much attention among
academia and policy makers. This issue deserves renewed research attention and deeper
understanding, given recent developments such as the decline in defined benefit (DB) pension
plans and the shift to defined contribution (DC) plans, ongoing and proposed Social Security (SS)
reforms, and exploding health care costs for retirees as well as for workers.
This paper investigates the determinants of retirement behavior among older workers that
were surveyed by the Health and Retirement Study (1992-2004). Our analysis includes both
conventional explanatory variables and new variables to reflect recent environmental changes.
We revisit issues deemed important in previous studies and add new insights to the retirement
literature. First, our data follows the employment-retirement behavior of older workers for up to
a dozen years. Second, our modeling of the ongoing Social Security retirement age changes
reveals the significant policy-driven retirement differences across cohorts. Third, we
comprehensively model all major sources of health insurance coverage and have identified their
varying impacts. Fourth, besides the finding of a significant difference in retirement timing
between DB and DC plan participants, our construction of the DC wealth-earnings replacement
rate provides a unique way to gauge the susceptibility of DC plan participants to stock market
and interest rate fluctuations.
It is found that increases in all categories of wealth accumulation (retirement plan,
housing equity and other financial wealth) increase the probability of retiring, but differentially,
while good earnings prospects, implying high opportunity cost for retirement, induce continued
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employment. It is worth noting that our construction of earnings prospects or opportunity costs
forms an alternative but more straightforward way to incorporate the forward-looking incentives
for continued employment, which are shown by some studies to be important.
Retirement plan types have significant impacts on retirement: besides the almost
universal Social Security, workers who are additionally entitled to DB plan benefits are more
likely to retire than those who are not, while the DC plan coverage significantly delays
retirement. This phenomenon is presumably in part because many DB plans have work
disincentives beyond certain ages while DC plans are largely age neutral, and in part because
most DB plans provide a more secure retirement income flow thus lowering overall household
exposure to risk.
There is a concern that the retirement behavior of the DC plan covered workers is
sensitive to stock market boom and bust. Our analysis incorporates business cycle effects, as part
of the total DC plan effect, by including income flow fluctuations that are due to investment
performance and market interest rate cycles. These are risks particular to DC plan participants.
We find new evidence to support the above hypothesis, that is, the probability and thus timing of
retirement for DC plan participants are susceptible to the influence of business cycles. Workers
who have significant income loss (gain) in their DC plans are less (more) likely to retire. This
may impose some challenges to employers in work force management. When there are market
booms, DC plan participants retire just when companies need to add workers and when there are
market busts, DC plan participants stay at work just when companies want to cut the workforce.
Regarding the impact of health insurance (HI) on the retirement decision, our study
reveals that HI, if conditional on employment, strongly discourages retirement, while alternative
sources of health insurance such as employer-sponsored retiree HI, spouse’s HI, or public HI,
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facilitate or may encourage labor force exit. This finding highlights the importance for employers,
in pursuit of strategies for human resource management, to consider retirement incentives
inherent in pension plans jointly with the benefits provided by other programs such as health
insurance. It should also be noted that benefits modifications for retirees (such as
enhancing/eliminating retiree health care coverage) may significantly alter the retirement
incentives for current employees.
Various studies have investigated the importance of Social Security benefits as an
explanation for early retirements. In this respect, we have rigorously incorporated the cohortspecific actuarial adjustment factors of S.S. benefits as defined by the law. Our analysis finds
that the retirement behavior is significantly linked to such public policies. The ongoing increase
in the normal retirement age for Social Security will encourage younger cohorts to work longer.
We carefully incorporate various demographic characteristics in the regressions to control
for heterogeneity of retirement, to the extent allowed by the data. We, however, acknowledge
that our reduced form model may bear some insufficiency in addressing the probably
simultaneous determinations of savings and labor supply, joint retirement decisions of couples,
job mobility and availability of pension and health care coverage, and other endogeneities.
Structural models have been used by researchers to deal with the endogeneity issue and have
advanced the understanding of retirement behavior in some directions. These models, however,
are often confined to one particular aspect of behavior or the environment due to their
complexity, and furthermore bear the risk of biased parameter specifications. The reduced form
models, which are more transparent and comprehensive, serve as useful complements and guides
to structural models.
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In what follows, this paper in sequence reviews briefly the relevant literature, describes
the data, discusses the results from the regression analysis, and gives concluding remarks.

Prior Studies
There is a large literature exploring the potential determinants of retirement among older
workers. Many insightful theoretical and empirical research findings have contributed to a
deeper understanding of this complex issue. Yet, many debates and questions can be answered
by new methods and data. As a recent example, Madrian, Mitchell, and Soldo (2007), using the
carefully designed Health and Retirement Study surveys, examine retirement prospects, health
status and health insurance, as well as wealth and asset investments for baby boomers. This
section highlights briefly the most policy-relevant strands of research and does not intend to
make the review complete.
One line of research has investigated the importance of wealth accrual and pension
coverage on the timing of retirement. Stock and Wise (1990) argue that workers have an
incentive to remain continued employment until certain ages (often the early retirement ages in
pension plans) if the expected gain in utility from postponing retirement outweighs the value of
immediate retirement. Coile and Gruber (2000) examine the Social Security incentives for
retirement and argue that it is in workers’ best interest to stay on the job so as to maximize the
Social Security wealth accrual – the “peak value”. Samwick (1998) also finds that the accrual
rate of retirement wealth is a significant determinant of the probability of retirement. He argues
that the rapidly growing pension coverage and Social Security entitlements since the 1940s could
be the underlying cause of the decline in labor force participation in the early postwar period.
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A second direction of research looks at the impact of pension types on retirement
behavior. Friedberg and Webb (2005) argue that DB plans tend to have age-related work
(dis)incentives that first discourage and later encourage retirement, which contribute to early
retirement and lead DB covered workers to retire almost two years earlier on average, compared
to workers with DC plans. Munnell, Triest, and Jivan (2004) study how pensions affect expected
and actual retirement ages. Regarding the actual retirement decision, they find that pension
wealth increases the probability of retiring, while the opportunities of pension accruals lower the
probability, and that the DB coverage per se raises probability of actual retirement, while DC
coverage reduces the probability. Based on survey data about faculty retirement expectations,
Flaherty (2006) finds that individuals in DC-only plan situations expect to retire nearly a year
later than those in a DB plan, in the context that earlier voluntary enrollments in DB or DC plans
by faculty members to some degree reveal their differential retirement preferences.
DB plans provide a steady stream of guaranteed income, while DC plans place
participants in considerable exposure to investment and longevity risks. The decline in DB plans
and the shift to DC plans in the past decades have aroused concern that DC plan covered workers
are vulnerable to business cycles or stock market booms and busts. The empirical findings thus
far are inconclusive, however. Cheng and French (2000) estimate that about 15 percent of
individuals aged 55 and over had an unanticipated wealth increase of $50,000 or more in
constant 1999 dollars between year-ends of 1994 and 1999. The labor force participation rates
among them, however, increased in this market boom period. The authors believe that the run-up
in the stock market was not the primary determinant of employment changes in those years.
Among other reasons, the authors conjecture that the changes may well be attributable to the
improved employment opportunities and wages in the strong economy and the reduction of work
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disincentives in the Social Security system. Coile and Levine (2006) focus on aggregate trends in
labor supply rather than the wealth effects on individual retirements and find no evidence that
stock market changes were the driving force because, first, few households have substantial
stock holdings, and second, they must be extremely responsive to market fluctuations to generate
the observed aggregate employment reversal in the recession (i.e., an increase in the labor force
participation rate for older workers aged 55 to 64 between 2000 and 2002).
By contrast, some other studies do find evidence that stock market fluctuations alter
retirement behavior. Coronado and Perozek (2003) study the impact of the stock market boom on
retirement decisions, explaining the difference between actual and expected retirement ages
among HRS respondents. They find that HRS respondents who held equity prior to the bull
market of the 1990s retired, on average, 7 months earlier than other respondents. The estimate by
Hermes and Ghilarducci (2006) on Current Population Survey data shows that the stock market
crash since January 2000 caused the labor force participation of older workers aged 55-64 to
increase by 2.6 percent and 5.4 percent for men and women, respectively. Their separate estimate
on HRS data shows that the probability of retirement for men aged 61-64 with DC plans fell by
10.7 percentage points from 1998 to 2002. However, their results are sensitive to the age ranges
selected.1
Another important strand of research is devoted to the effect of health insurance on
retirement decisions. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994), based on the then-modest employer
contribution cost to employee HI ($2,500 per year before age 65), find a small effect of
employer-provided health insurance on retirement behavior. Rust and Phelan (1997), explicitly
modeling individual risk aversion and a distribution of health care expenditures in a dynamic
lifecycle framework, find strong impacts of HI and Medicare on retirement, that is, a significant
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fraction of “health insurance constrained” individuals “optimally” remain employed to attain HI
coverage until they are eligible for Medicare coverage at age 65. Blau and Gilleskie (2001) show
that the availability of employer-provided retiree health insurance increases the rate of labor exit.
Blau and Gilleskie (2003) similarly show that the access and restrictions to retiree health
insurance and Medicare have a modest impact on employment behavior. French and Jones (2004)
argue that the value of employer-provided HI not only lies in cost reduction but also uncertainty
reduction for employees. Their simulations project that an increase in Medicare eligibility age
will significantly delay retirement, if workers have no other source of insurance but that tied to
employment. Rust (2005) simulates faculty retirement decisions and shows that an elimination of
the retiree health plan (or a substantial reduction of its generosity) as a cost-cutting measure may
significantly reduce the incentive for the existing faculty to retire. Mulvey and Nyce (2005) show
that, besides DB pension plans, the availability of retiree health insurance boosts the likelihood
of early retirement and that linking the employer-paid insurance premium to service tenure
would mitigate such early exit.

Data
In this analysis, we use the longitudinal, cross-section data from the Health and
Retirement Study waves 1992-2004. The HRS dataset is representative of the national population
of older workers and retirees and provides detailed information on demographics, health status
and insurance coverage, income and wealth, and employment or retirement status about
Americans over the age of 50.2 The HRS respondents and their spouses are (re)interviewed every
two years. We exclude those observations that lack a work-retirement transition. Specifically, the
“AHEAD” cohort respondents (born in 1924) and early baby boomers (born in 1948-1953) are
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dropped because the former were generally already in the retirement phase when surveyed while
the latter were added to HRS survey in 2004 and therefore have only one observation. We focus
on the retirement behavior of older workers in the private sector and exclude government
workers (determined, for each worker, by the job with longest tenure). The analysis is focused on
the retirement decision for those respondents aged between 50 and 75.
The final data set consists of the following cohorts: HRS (born in 1931-1941) with survey
data 1992-2004, Children of Depression (born in 1924-1930) with survey data 1998-2004, and
War Babies (born in 1942-1947) with survey data 1998-2004. Each respondent therefore has up
to seven observations. An implicit assumption here is that retirement is reversible – survey
respondents may return to work (although not necessarily with the same firm) after retirement.
This is not a stringent assumption given the documented findings of retirement reversal in the
literature. Ruhm (1990) and Maestas (2007) each find that about a quarter of retirees moved to
“unretirement”, while many others reversed from full retirement to partial retirement. More
recently, Chan and Stevens (forthcoming) show that about one third of older individuals who are
ever partially or fully retired in the HRS data have reversed their retirement status. Clearly, this
evidence is more consistent with a “spot” view of the labor market than a “long-term contract”
view.
Retirement is the result of a complex decision-making process. Various economic and
demographic factors are expected to jointly influence and facilitate the transition from
employment to retirement, or a reversal when applicable. We estimate a probit regression model
to identify factors that may help explain the probability of retirement at any age. As retirement
behavior is person- or household-specific, demographic characteristics naturally play an
important role. In the empirical study, we first control for such factors as age, gender,
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educational attainment level, marital status, spouse employment status, good or bad health, selfemployment, occupation, union membership, longevity expectation, and employment-retirement
transition through a bridge job. Particularly interesting are the impacts of the following broader
environmental factors: retirement plan coverage, vulnerability of DC plan accounts to the
business cycle, wealth adequacy, earnings prospects, Social Security rules, and health insurance
coverage.
The Appendix describes the construction of all variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 1 below summarizes the basic data statistics of HRS respondents who are eventually
entered in the regressions. These demographic and financial statistics indicate that the data
sample seems to be fairly representative of the population of older workers. The HRS
respondent-level weights are used in the regressions to make the analysis nationally
representative. All wealth and income values are in constant 2004 dollars and the unit of
measurement is $10,000.
Table 1 here
Empirical Results: Estimating and Explaining the Probability of Retirement. In the probit
regression model, the binary dependent variable takes the value of 0 or 1, indicating that the
survey respondent is “not retired” or “retired”, respectively, if the HRS labor force participation
data indicates so. We group partial and full retirements together in the main regression, but also
treat them separately in an ordered probit model; the results are not sensitive to the alternative
specification (see Robustness Tests below). A respondent is also classified as retired if he/she is
older than 65 but the labor force participation status is missing, if disabled or not in labor force
but older than 62, or if disabled, younger than 62 and receiving Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits. The variable value of 0 otherwise indicates full- or part-time employment
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including those unemployed but looking for a full time job.3 The regressors are those relevant
variables listed above. Table 2 below reports the complete regression results for the benchmark
and alternative specifications. The probit marginal effects on most of the variables are
statistically significant at 1 or 5 percent level and others at 10 percent. The pseudo R2 is roughly
0.30 in all regressions, which suggests that our econometric specifications fit the data well. The
average retirement probability observed in the data is 22 percent and our models predict a
probability of about 15 percent using average values of all variables. We first report briefly the
results on the demographic control variables and then highlight the key findings in the
benchmark Specification 1 that may be more policy relevant.
Table 2 here
Demographics. Various demographic variables, which are from the HRS surveys and included
in the regression, are found to have an influence on retirement decisions. The probability of
retirement naturally increases when workers get older (about 3.1 percentage points for one year
increase in age). Workers who have higher educational attainment, are male, have bad health, or
are union members, tend to have higher probabilities of retiring at any age. Self-employed
workers and married workers are more likely to work longer. On the other hand, married workers
often show some accord in the retirement timing with their spouses – workers have a greater
tendency to stop working when their spouses are retired. Life expectancy affects retirement
decision – workers who anticipate a good chance of living to advanced ages are more likely to
retire later.
A somewhat surprising finding is that workers tend to have a lower retirement probability
when their current job is physically challenging, despite the inclusion of health status, wealth and
income variables and other characteristics in the regression. Similarly, Munnell, Triest and Jivan
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(2004) also find that this dummy variable increases actual retirement age, though it has a
negative impact on expected retirement age. “Self selection” may be a plausible (but untested)
explanation. That is, these workers may actually prefer to remain active after years of physical
work.
We also control for the situations where workers have taken a bridge job, given the
importance of a bridge job in the employment-retirement transition (Ruhm (1990), among
others). The dummy variable takes value 1 if the respondent’s tenure on current job is no more
than 2 years and is planning to retire in 2 years, or is older than 60 when the planned retirement
year is missing. The dummy is also set to 1 if the worker has retired from a bridge job defined
here. Not surprisingly, workers who have taken a bridge job have a higher probability of retiring
simply because they have been in the transition.
Retirement Plan Coverage. The recent changes in private pension systems, especially the
increasing reliance on DC plans for the provision of retiree benefits, have attracted widespread
interest regarding whether the shift is shaking up retirement patterns. DB plans generally use a
predetermined formula to calculate retirement benefits based on salary and number of service
years. Regardless of capital market conditions, in a traditional DB plan, retirees receive a steady
flow of income benefits for as long as they are alive. DC plan participants, by contrast, bear the
risks of investment fluctuations and longevity. The uncertainty of retirement account
accumulations and the risk of outliving funds may cause DC plan participants to become more
cautious in their work decisions.
We identify the retirement plan coverage based on the value of wealth in that plan form,
which is attributable to all work histories, not necessarily confined to the current job. Specifically,
a person is covered by a DB plan if the present value of his/her future or current DB benefits is
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greater than zero. Similarly, a positive DC account balance means that there is DC coverage. In
the regression, we find that DB pension plan coverage has a significantly positive effect on the
retirement hazard. Besides the almost universal Social Security coverage, workers who are
additionally entitled to DB plan benefits are more likely to retire than those who are not, with the
probability of retiring at any age being 4.1 percentage points higher. The impact of DC plan
coverage differs, however, in a negative manner and is also statistically significant. Workers,
whose non-S.S. retirement income is mainly DC plan wealth, exhibit a lower probability of labor
force exit by 3.6 percentage points.
Wealth Adequacy. The standard life cycle theory postulates that retirement is the wealth
decumulation phase in contrast to the wealth creation phase in the working years. Wealth
adequacy, among other things, determines whether such a transition is desirable and whether a
reasonable standard of living can be maintained in the retirement years, which are everincreasing in cost with continued rapid inflation of health care and long-term care costs.
Wealth is defined at the household level, as reported in the HRS. This measure is
probably valid because retiring household members may consider the whole family economic
situation as the relevant background rather than the wealth held separately under each household
member’s name. Nevertheless, we adjust the household wealth for household size in an
alternative specification. The results are not sensitive to these different wealth measures (see
Robustness Tests at end of this section).
We include four categories of wealth in the regression without a priori imposing a
common coefficient on any form of wealth. Social Security and DB plan wealth, both measured
by present discounted values of future benefit payouts, are pooled together given their similar
annuity nature. DC wealth includes both DC plan and IRA account balances. Net housing equity

13
refers to the value of primary and secondary houses less mortgages and home loans. Nonhousing financial wealth includes all other household financial assets net of debt, excluding
housing equity, retirement plans, and IRAs. The regression results show that all types of wealth
help encourage retirement, which is by no means surprising. Interestingly, they have differential
impacts. An improvement in wealth adequacy, for instance, a $100,000 windfall in the above
four categories, would imply higher probability of retiring by approximately 0.8, 0.4, 0.1 and 0.3
percentage points, respectively.
Earnings Prospect or Opportunity Cost. Individuals are compensated when they are working
and their labor earnings typically form the major source for consumption and savings. The
transition to a full (partial) retirement implies the cessation (reduction) of such earnings, which
can be viewed as the opportunity cost for retirees. The higher the earnings prospect, the higher is
the opportunity cost. Presumably, the probability of retirement is lower when the marginal gain
of working an extra year is large. In our construction, the opportunity cost for a switch to a
partial retirement is the full-time earnings last year, while the opportunity cost for a complete
labor force exit is the previous full- or part-time earnings, depending on whether he/she was
working full or part time last year.
The opportunity cost is also adjusted by a growth/depreciation factor estimated on the
CPS March surveys 1989-2007 by gender and age. The calculation of growth factors is immune
to cohort differences in earnings levels and is aggregated across cohort age-earnings profiles.4
For instance, the annual earnings reduction for male workers aged 70 averages 1 percent in real
terms.
The regression shows that an earnings prospect of $100,000, implying significant
opportunity cost for retirement, would reduce the probability of retiring by roughly 3.1
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percentage points, other things equal. This shows a tradeoff for retiring workers in that continued
employment leads to more earnings and higher pension and wealth accrual while the income
effect at the same time increases the desire for leisure (retirement).
Social Security Rules. The U.S. population is aging and fewer workers are projected to
contribute to the Social Security system relative to the number of beneficiaries, which is deemed
financially unsustainable absent reforms on current payroll contribution rates and benefit payout
levels. As one of the measures already being used to improve the financial solvency of Social
Security, the full (normal) retirement age (FRA) is being gradually increased from 65 to 67.
Various studies have conjectured that this move will induce more employment among older
workers.
To capture the impact of Social Security rules on retirement behavior, we include the
early retirement benefit reduction factor in percentage terms as a regressor (negative values).
This variable is simply the permanent actuarial benefit reduction factor defined by SSA based on
birth year if a person claims Social Security earlier than FRA. For instance, it takes the value of 20 percent if a person born in 1937 with FRA 65 starts claming a S.S. retirement benefit at age
62, -13.3 percent at age 63, -6.7 percent at age 64 and 0 percent at age 65, while a person born in
1938 and a person born in 1960 who start claiming S.S. at age 62 would receive less S.S. benefits
by 20.83 percent and 30 percent, respectively, because their FRAs are 65 and 2 months and 67,
respectively.5
The regression result suggests that a reduction of 10 percentage points in S.S. benefit
implies a lower probability of retiring by approximately 1.2 percentage points. Perhaps the
easiest way to interpret this effect is look at the possible retirement decisions between the 1937
and 1943 birth cohorts, for instance. Their FRAs are 65 and 66, respectively. Their respective
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benefit reductions are 20 percent and 25 percent at the earliest retirement age 62. This 5
percentage points difference imposed by the 1 year difference in FRA would imply a lower
probability of retiring at age 62 for the 1943 cohort by more than a half percentage point, ceteris
paribus. The alternative Specification 2 in Table 2 would suggest a much larger effect:
approximately 1.7 percentage point difference in retirement probability between the 1937 and
1943 cohorts. That is, younger cohorts will probably exhibit less early retirement.
Implication of Business Cycle for DC plan participants. Compared to DB plans, DC plan
values are vulnerable to business cycles. Though DC participants may have the chance to skim
substantial investment returns in a booming capital market, their retirement transition may turn
out to be quite bumpy when investment performance is poor. In addition to the possible
shrinkage of DC wealth, a DC participant is also faced with market fluctuations of interest rates
if she/he were to purchase a life annuity in the commercial market, a necessary product for
insurance against longevity risk.
To reflect the effects of business cycle and the timing of annuity purchase, we calculate
the lifetime payouts that can be generated by the DC wealth at market annuity prices, expressed
as a percentage of average earnings over survey years 1992-2004. In the calculation, a joint and
survivor life table is used (full benefit to survivor). Interest rates are the going 30-year Treasury
bond yields in the survey years. A higher replacement rate implies better preparation for
retirement. To isolate the timing effect, the same duration of annuity payout is used (age 65 to
100) regardless of the respondent’s age; otherwise this variable would include an age effect.
This DC plan payout-earnings replacement rate is similar in notion to the Social Security
and DB pension payouts as percentage of pre-retirement income, which are commonly used to
measure financial preparedness for retirement. It is worth noting that actual annuitization is not a
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prerequisite for this measure to validly reflect DC plan exposure to business cycles. Rather
broadly, any retirees who live off interest income from their DC account (e.g. an interest-only
strategy) will be affected by changes in interest rates in the same direction as with annuity
factors.6
This variable has a statistically significant affect on retirement. Specifically, a drop of 10
percentage points in the replacement rate, due to poor investment performance on DC wealth or
due to hike in annuity purchase prices in the market, implies a lower probability of retirement in
any year by approximately 1 percentage point.
Health Insurance. For most workers, employer sponsored health insurance is an integral part of
the benefits package. Such health insurance coverage may be particularly valuable among the
older workers because the probability of falling ill and the risk of suffering catastrophic health
care costs generally increase with age. Health care costs and insurance premiums have been on
an upward trend in recent decades. Absent employer sponsorship or another source of support,
workers upon retirement may face steep increases in health and insurance costs, which is likely
to discourage early retirement. On the other hand, if an employer provides retiree health
insurance (RHI), its employees need not be tied to continued employment and thus have more
flexibility in retirement timing. Alternatively, a worker covered by a health insurance via his/her
spouse’s employer also has such flexibility.
Another critical channel of health insurance is through the government-run public
insurance and welfare programs. For instance, Medicare, a federal health insurance program,
covers most people age 65 or older and some people younger than 65 with disabilities. Medicaid
covers people with limited income or resources for a living. These public programs help support
and may actually encourage retirement beyond a certain age (like 65 for the case of Medicare).
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Under certain circumstances such as employment termination and other events, workers
have the rights to continue their group health insurance on a temporary basis, paying up to 102
percent of the premium, according to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA). The premium, determined on a group basis, is generally lower, because it is
subsidized by other plan members, for the older workers compared with health insurance on the
retail individual market. That is, COBRA provides an alternative way, absent RHI or spousal HI
coverage, for retiring workers to bridge their transition into retirement especially in ages 63-65
prior to Medicare eligibility because COBRA generally stipulates a maximum of 18 months
continuation coverage, ended with eligibility for Medicare.
In the regression analysis, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether a HRS
respondent is covered by health insurance via his/her own employer. This is an employmentbased HI coverage. A separate dummy variable reflects whether the respondent has access to HI
coverage that is not tied to employment, that is, he/she is eligible to retiree HI coverage by
his/her previous or current employer, or he/she is covered by the health plan sponsored by his/her
spouse’ employer. Another dummy variable is used to indicate whether the respondent is covered
by Medicare, Medicaid, VA/CHAMPUS or other government health insurance. It is observed
that these types of HI coverage work as substitutes – many workers switch to an HI coverage
delinked to employment, in working years as well as upon retirement. As public HI mainly eases
life in retirement, the RHI and spouse’s HI coverage help bridge the transition from employment
to early retirement if a worker is not eligible for Medicare yet. As an alternative, COBRA also
facilitates the transition and a dummy variable is included to indicate this option for workers
aged 63-65.7
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The regression result shows that health insurance coverage, if conditional on employment,
significantly discourages retirement – the probability of retiring in any year being approximately
16.5 percentage points lower. When HI coverage is available through own employer RHI or
spouse’s HI, the worker is more likely to retire – the probability is roughly 7.6 percentage points
higher. Government-sponsored HI programs have an unsurprisingly positive effect on retirement
– a higher probability of retirement by approximately 10.8 percentage points for those under
such coverage. The COBRA option boosts retirement by about 1.7 percentage points.
The regression apparently reveals tremendous impact of all major sources of health
insurance coverage on retirement. This finding highlights the importance of integrating
retirement incentives in pension plans with the benefits provided by health insurance. A plausible
further inference from this finding is that, for an employer to strategically manage human
resources, enhancing or eliminating health care coverage for its retirees may have significant
impact on current employees’ retirement incentive.
Robustness Tests. To check the robustness of our regression results, we test various
specifications. Specifically, we allow for possible nonlinear effect of age by including age
squared and age cubed (Specification 2 in Table 2), and dummy variables for some specific ages,
adjust wealth for married couples to account for their joint consumption by dividing their
household wealth in all categories by square root of 2 (Specification 3), adjust wealth as in
Specification 3 and exclude observations on spouses to restrain the regressions on one person in
the same household (Specification 4), run an ordered probit model to treat partial and full
retirements separately, run a random effects probit model on the panel data,8 subtract the selfreported employer and employee contributions from the calculation of DC wealth-earnings
replacement rate to further isolate the business cycle impact, and use an additional variable to
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reflect retirement age flexibility in DB plans (defined as the difference between earliest and full
retirement ages, perhaps an indication of early retirement incentives).9 These alternative
specifications only slightly change the magnitudes of coefficients and maintain the same signs.10

Conclusions
This paper identifies empirically the critical determinants of retirement behavior of older
workers, after carefully controlling for demographic factors. It shows that the likelihood of
retirement increases with wealth adequacy and decreases with improved employment
opportunities and earnings prospects. More importantly, the findings in this study may suggest
that the labor force participation pattern is now undergoing significant transition. Workers under
defined contribution plans tend to retire later and their timing of retirement is sensitive to
business cycles. Changes in the Social Security rules such as a hike of normal retirement age will
push for a longer work career for the younger cohorts. Exploding health care costs make
employer-sponsored health insurance increasingly valuable, which, in the context of the
elimination of retiree health insurance by some employers,11 may turn out to strongly induce
continued employment until eligibility for Medicare.
Employers, when crafting benefit packages to strategically manage human resources, and
policy makers, when designing public policies to improve worker well-being, need to take into
account all benefits programs in an integrated manner. To retain older but still productive
workers and promote an orderly retirement process, employers may want to carefully tailor their
retirement schemes to meet both corporate and employees’ needs in a dynamic and competitive
labor market.
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Appendix: Data and Variable Description
The data source is the Health and Retirement Study waves 1992-2004 (Rand version G). The
table below describes the construction of all variables used in the regressions. All dollar values
are in constant 2004 terms and the unit is $10,000.
Variable Name
Binary Dependent Variable
Retirement

Retirement Plan Coverage
DB only
DC only
Both DB and DC
Wealth ($10,000)
SS&DB Wealth
DC Wealth
Net Housing Equity
Non-Housing Financial Wealth
Impact of Business Cycle
DC Replacement Rate

Social Security Impact
Early Retirement Benefit Reduction
(%, non-positive value)

Definition
This variable equals to 1 if a respondent is partially or fully retired when
the labor force participation data indicates so. He/she is also treated as
retired if he/she is older than 65 but the labor force status is missing, if
disabled or not in labor force but older than 62, or if disabled, younger
than 62 and receiving Social Security Disability Insurance benefit. The
observation is dropped if the respondent is not in labor force and
younger than 62. The variable is equal to 0 otherwise, including those
unemployed but looking for a full time job.
(omitted reference: Social Security coverage only)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by DB plan only
(based on DB & DC wealth), 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by DC plan only
(based on DB & DC wealth), 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by both DB and
DC plans (based on DB & DC wealth), 0 otherwise
Household wealth in Social Security and DB pension plan (present
discounted value)
Household wealth in DC plan and IRAs
Value of primary and secondary houses less mortgages and home loans.
Total household assets – all debt – housing equity, excluding IRA
This variable is the annuity payouts that can be generated by the DC
wealth at market annuity prices, expressed as a percentage of average
earnings over survey years 1992-2004. It reflects the effects of business
cycle and the timing of annuity purchase. A higher replacement rate
implies better preparation for retirement.
In the annuity calculation, a joint and survivor life table is used (full
benefit to survivor). Interest rates are the going 30-year Treasury bond
rates in the survey years. To isolate the timing effect, the same duration
of annuity payout is used (65-100) regardless of the respondent’s age;
otherwise this variable would include the age effect.
(partially cohort effect)
This is the permanent actuarial benefit reduction factor in percentage if
the respondent claims Social Security earlier than full retirement age
(FRA) defined by SSA based on birth year. For instance, it takes value 20% if a person born in 1937 starts claming S.S. benefit at age 62, 13.3% at age 63, -6.7% at age 64 and 0% at age 65, while a person born
in 1938 and a person born in 1960 who start claiming S.S. at age 62
would receive less S.S. benefits by 20.83% and 30%, respectively,
because their FRAs are 65 and 2 months and 67, respectively.
This variable is set to -50% for respondents younger than 62 because
they are not eligible for S.S. (0% inappropriate). The regression results
are not sensitive to alternative values such as -40%, -100% or others.

Earnings Prospect ($10,000)
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Variable Name
Earnings or Opportunity Cost

Definition
This variable reflects the earnings if the respondent chooses to work or
opportunity cost if she chooses to retire.
For a full-time worker, this variable equals earnings (wage/salary
income + bonuses/overtime pay/commissions/tips + 2nd job or military
reserve earnings, professional practice or trade income). The opportunity
cost for a switch to a partial retirement is the full-time earnings last year,
while the opportunity cost for a full retirement is the previous full- or
part-time earnings, whichever applicable.
In the construction of opportunity costs, previous earnings are adjusted
by a growth/depreciation factor, which is calculated on CPS March
surveys 1989-2007 by gender and age.

Health Insurance Coverage
HI conditional on R’s employment
HI unconditional on R’s
employment
HI via public program

COBRA

Demographics
Age
Male
Bad Health

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by health
insurance via his/her own employer, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by retiree health
insurance via his/her own employer, or by his/her spouse’s HI or retiree
HI, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by Medicare,
Medicaid, VA/CHAMPUS or other government health insurance, 0
otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is aged 63-65 and currently
have (or had in last survey year) employer provided health insurance, 0
otherwise.

Actual age
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is male, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if self-reported health status is fair or poor, 0
otherwise (good, very good, and excellent).
Self Employed
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is self employed, 0
otherwise.
Current Job Physically Challenging
Dummy variable equal to 1 if current job requires lots of physical effort,
lifting heavy loads, or stooping/kneeling /crouching), 0 otherwise. The
value for retirees is determined by their previous job.
Bridge Job
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s tenure on current job is
no more than 2 years and is planning to retire in 2 years, or is older than
60 when the planned retirement year is missing, 0 otherwise. The
dummy is set to 1 if a worker has retired from a bridge job defined here.
Union Member
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is covered by labor union,
0 otherwise. The value for retirees is determined by their previous job.
Married
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise.
Spouse Retired
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s spouse is retired, 0
otherwise.
High School Diploma or GED
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has high school or GED
degree, 0 otherwise.
Some College Education
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has some college education
(degree less than a BA), 0 otherwise.
College Degree and above
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent has a BA degree or greater,
0 otherwise.
The omitted category is education less than high school.
Longevity Expectation
Self-reported subjective probability (0 – 100%) of living to age 75+.
Source: Authors’ constructions based on Health and Retirement Study 1992-2004 survey data.
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Table 1 Summary Data Statistics
Variable
Retired
Age
Male
Married
Spouse retired
Bad health
Probability of living to age 75+ (%)

Median
0
59
0
1
0
0
75

Mean
0.23
58.42
0.46
0.75
0.22
0.13
67.77

Std. Dev.
0.42
4.19
0.50
0.43
0.41
0.34
26.84

Self-Employed
Current job physically challenging
Bridge job
Union member

0
0
0
0

0.13
0.23
0.04
0.22

High school degree or GED
Some college education
College degree and above

0
0
0

DB coverage only
DC coverage only
Both DB and DC coverage
Health insurance, conditional on employment
Health insurance, unconditional on employment
Health insurance, public
COBRA

Min
0
50
0
0
0
0
0

Max
1
74
1
1
1
1
100

0.34
0.42
0.20
0.41

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.38
0.23
0.24

0.49
0.42
0.43

0
0
0

1
1
1

0
0
0

0.17
0.30
0.35

0.37
0.46
0.48

0
0
0

1
1
1

1
1
0
0

0.62
0.58
0.10
0.08

0.49
0.49
0.29
0.27

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

S.S. early retirement benefits reduction (- %)
-50 -39.30
17.94
-50
Social Security Wealth (PDV)
15.70 16.71
7.32
0
Defined Benefit pension wealth (PDV)
14.06 23.82
34.12
0
S.S. + DB Wealth (PDV)
21.29 28.62
28.86
0
Defined Contribution plan wealth
1.49
7.98
22.79
0
Net housing equity
8.22 12.13
29.91
-638.4
Non-housing financial wealth
1.88
9.98
42.47
-91.9
Total household wealth
41.88 58.72
77.33
-617.8
Earnings prospect or Opportunity cost
3.01
4.01
5.59
0
Total household income
6.03
8.14
10.66
0
DC wealth-earnings replacement rate (%)
2.91 15.96
43.54
0
Note: Wealth and income variables are in constant 2004 terms and the unit is $10,000.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Health and Retirement Study 1992-2004 survey data.

0
66.5
1485.5
1521.1
2163.9
2280.7
3675.5
4791.7
404.6
593.0
400.0
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Table 2 Probit Regression Results – Marginal Effects on Retirement Decision
Binary Dependent Variable: 1 = retired, 0 = not retired
Independent Variable
DB Coverage Only
Both DB & DC Coverage
DC Coverage Only
S.S.+DB Wealth (PDV)
DC Wealth
Net Housing Equity
Non-Housing Financial Wealth
Earnings Prospect or Opportunity Cost
DC Wealth-Earnings Replacement Rate (%)
S.S. Early Retirement Benefit Reduction (-%)
Health Insurance, conditional on Employment
Health Insurance, unconditional on Employment
Health Insurance, Public
COBRA
Age
Age Squared
Age Cubed
High School Degree or GED
Some College
College and Above
Male
Bad Health
Self-Employed
Current Job Physically Challenging
Bridge Job
Union Member
Married
Spouse Retired
Probability of Living to age 75+

Specification 1
dF/dx
z
0.04052
4.12***
-0.02477 -2.73***
-0.03603 -4.60***
0.00079
4.46***
0.00037
1.88*
0.00014
1.95**
0.00025
2.95***
-0.00305 -2.53**
0.00083 10.54***
0.00115
4.95***
-0.16487 -24.82***
0.07610 14.12***
0.10844 12.25***
0.01651
1.90*
0.03016 24.76***
----0.02394
3.21***
0.02359
2.76***
0.03064
3.32***
0.04337
7.25***
0.09800 12.40***
-0.05567 -6.75***
-0.01881 -3.23***
0.05726
4.89***
0.01863
2.75***
-0.06473 -9.28***
0.16756 23.37***
-0.00027 -2.84***

Specification 2
dF/dx
Z
0.04113
4.22***
-0.02328 -2.60***
-0.03389 -4.37***
0.00078
4.44***
0.00038
1.98**
0.00013
1.90*
0.00024
2.97***
-0.00302 -2.55**
0.00081 10.46***
0.00348
9.39***
-0.16119 -24.59***
0.07377 13.87***
0.14512 13.98***
0.09817
1.17
-0.70202
-1.49
0.01479
1.85*
-0.00009
-2.16**
0.02410
3.28***
0.02359
2.80***
0.03061
3.36***
0.04184
7.09***
0.09434 12.07***
-0.05478
-6.76***
-0.01904
-3.32***
0.05427
4.78***
0.01858
2.78***
-0.06303
-9.15***
0.16458 22.23***
-0.00026
-2.81***

Specification 3
dF/dx
z
0.03769
3.83***
-0.02705 -2.98***
-0.03645 -4.65***
0.00112
4.85***
0.00041
1.55
0.00023
2.36**
0.00024
2.35**
-0.00313 -2.46**
0.00085 10.66***
0.00116
4.98***
-0.16458 -24.76***
0.07522
13.94***
0.10874
12.27***
0.01628
1.87**
0.03019
24.78***
----0.02342
3.14***
0.02313
2.71***
0.03061
3.31***
0.04372
7.30***
0.09832 12.44***
-0.05615
-6.82***
-0.01895
-3.26***
0.05680
4.86***
0.01803
2.66***
-0.05217
-7.31***
0.16796
23.40***
-0.00026
-2.79***

Specification 4
dF/dx
z
0.04127
3.53***
-0.02322 -2.14**
-0.04162 -4.22***
0.00097
4.42***
0.00065
2.09**
0.00031
2.29**
0.00015
1.34
-0.00269 -1.99**
0.00088
7.91***
0.00128
4.49***
-0.17522 -19.85***
0.08137 12.09***
0.11492 10.54***
0.00003
0.00
0.02815 19.14***
----0.02095
2.27**
0.02033
1.96**
0.02530
2.27**
0.04596
6.37***
0.09981 10.69***
-0.05271
-5.13***
-0.03023
-4.29***
0.05785
4.13***
0.02000
2.42**
-0.05445
-6.65***
0.16374 16.60***
-0.00041
-3.62***
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Specification 1

Specification 2

Specification 3

Specification 4

No. of Obs.
31604
31604
31604
21074
obs. P
0.217
0.217
0.217
0.210
pred. P (at x-bar)
0.149
0.145
0.149
0.144
Wald Chi2
5308.7
5322.0
5317.9
3367.5
Prob > chi2
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Log pseudo likelihood
-11650.5
-11613.2
-11645.0
-7720.4
Pseudo R2
0.2959
0.2981
0.2962
0.2879
Note:
a. Wealth and income variables are in constant 2004 terms and the unit is $10,000.
b. Specification 2 allows for non-linear effect of age; Specification 3 adjusts wealth by dividing household wealth by square root of 2 for married
couples; and Specification 4 drops observations on spouses and adjusts household wealth for married couples as in Specification 3.
c. The HRS respondent-level weights are used in the probit regressions.
d. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
Source: Authors’ regression results based on Health and Retirement Study 1992-2004 survey data.
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Endnotes
1

The magnitude and sign of the interaction term between DC coverage and year 2002 in

their nonlinear probit model is conditional on the independent variables. See Ai and
Norton (2003) for a discussion.
2

Source: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu. The data and documentation are the Rand

version G.
3

The separation of partial employment from partial retirement is directly based on the

HRS definition: “If he/she is working part-time and mentions retirement,” the labor force
status of the survey respondent “is set to partly retired” and “if there is no mention of
retirement,” the status “is set to working part-time”. Source: RAND HRS Data
Documentation, Version G, March 2007, p.1035.
4

The earnings growth/depreciation factors are calculated in several steps: 1) calculate

average full-time earnings of workers by age and gender for each cohort (e.g. age-25
workers in CPS1989, age-26 workers in CPS1990, … and age-44 workers in CPS2007
are considered as one birth cohort); 2) calculate earnings growth rate at each age for each
cohort; 3) average growth rates across birth cohorts; 4) use a polynomial of age to fit the
observed growth rates; and 5) these fitted and smoother growth rates are the factors used
for the adjustment on opportunity cost.
5

This variable is somewhat arbitrarily set to -50 percent for workers younger than 62 and

thus ineligible for Social Security. Zero percent is clearly not applicable. Regression
results are not sensitive to alternative values such as -100 percent (a stringent value to
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represent ineligibility) or -40 percent (a value just next to -30 percent that is applicable to
the 1960 and younger cohorts).
6

Technically, this DC plan wealth-earnings replacement rate can be viewed as an

interaction term between two regressors (DC wealth and labor earnings), but in a quotient
form, and adjusted by an annuity factor.
7

The HRS data do not provide information about COBRA take-up among workers nor

about whether their employers had 20 or more employees as required by COBRA. In a
parsimonious way, we assume all workers aged 63-65 are eligible for COBRA if they
currently have or in previous survey year had employer-provided health insurance.
8

A fixed-effects probit model is inappropriate because it fails to distinguish the effects of

those time-invariant variables. A random-effects probit model, however, may yield
inconsistent estimates because the assumption that the regressors are independent of error
terms does not necessarily hold.
9

The testing power of the last two experiments may be weakened by the limited data

availability. This analysis uses the self-reported DC plan contributions in the public HRS
data. It is also difficult to directly identify whether DB benefit payouts are actuarially
favorable for early retirees.
10

All results are available from authors upon request.

11

Mulvey and Nyce (2005, p.119), for instance, document that the share of medium and

large employers that sponsored some retiree health insurance declined from over 80
percent before 1980 to only 40 percent by 2003.

